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Abstract—Cognitive radio (CR) technology is considered to
be an effective solution for enhancing overall spectrum effi-
ciency. Using CR technology fully involves the providing of
incentives to Primary Radio Networks (PRNs) and revenue to
the service provider so that Secondary Base Stations (SBSs)
may utilize PRN spectrum bands accordingly. In this paper,
a cooperative games with incomplete information for SBSs in
a CR network is presented. Each SBS can cooperate with
neighboring SBSs in order to improve its view of the spec-
trum. Moreover, proposed game-theory models assume that
the devices have incomplete information about their compo-
nents, meaning that some players do not completely know the
structure of the game. Using the proposed algorithm, each
SBS can leave or join the coalition while maximizing its over-
all utility. The simulation results illustrate that the proposed
algorithm allows us to reduce the average payoff per SBS up
to 140% relative to a CR network without cooperation among
SBSs.
Keywords—Bayesian equilibrium, cognitive radio networks,
game theory, wireless communication.
1. Introduction
Cognitive radio (CR) was first proposed by J. Mitola [1]
as a way of ”scavering” fragments of unused spectrum and
designing signals accordingly. In the United States, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) later come
up with its Spectrum Policy Task Force (SPTF) report [2]
that opened up the television band as a start for CR pur-
poses. Moreover, the most recent FCC measurement [3]
concludes that 70% of allocated spectrum is not utilized in
the United States. Because of this, CR technology is con-
sidered one of the most attractive candidates to tackle such
challenge [4].
Node cooperation is fundamental to ensure acceptable per-
formance in CR networks. Cooperation in CR networks has
been studied by, among others, A. Ghasemi et al. In their
work, the authors showed that the collaboration among SUs
(Secondary Users) and the effects of the hidden terminal
problem can be reduced and the probability of detecting
the PU (Primary User) can be improved [5]. Moreover,
Zhang [7] has proposed that collaborative spectrum-sensing
spatial diversity techniques for improving collaborative
spectrum-sensing performance by detecting means of com-
bating error probability caused by fading the reporting
channel between the SUs and the central fusing center.
Thus, it is obvious that the deployment of all available
PUs in the exploration and use of the spectrum is a key
technology for the development of cognitive radio systems.
It allows to improve the quality and the amount of infor-
mation transmitted over radio channels. Unfortunately, the
PUs may belong to different service providers, and they in-
teract with each other by means of the cooperation between
the management centers.
In the literature, the Cognitive Pilot Channel (CPC) has
been proposed by P. Houz et al. [8] and M. Filo et al. [9]
as a means of providing frequency and geographical infor-
mation to cognitive users. As explained in these papers,
the CPC concept is based on control channels that carry
information such as available spectrum opportunities and
existing frequencies. Additionally, Sallent has proposed
a broadcast and on-demand method for delivering the CPC
data to the SUs [10]. According to this approach, each SU
can exchange its own information about the entire spectrum
to identify spectrum holes and available PUs. Collabora-
tion between the SBSs can lead to a significant decrease
of the costs of use and can improve the network structure’s
stability. In other words, a network of SBSs in every CR
network is responsible for gathering all information about
new PUs (the view of the spectrum, the position change de-
tection, etc.). Recently, W. Saad has proposed a coalition
formation among SBSs that can account for the tradeoffs
between the costs of receiving inaccurate information and
the benefit from learning about new channels through coali-
tion members [11].
Game theory is an essential tool for CR networks. Most
games considered in these systems are games with com-
plete information. For example, games with complete in-
formation have been studied in the distributed collaborative
spectrum sensing [12], for the sake of a dynamic spectrum
sharing [13], interference minimalization in the CR net-
works [14], designing independent parallel channels (i.e.,
OFDM) [15], etc. However, there are no existing methods
of calculating the equilibrium policy in a general game with
incomplete information. The imperfect information or par-
tial Channel State Information (CSI) means that the CSI is
not perfectly estimated/observed at the transmitter/receiver
side. This is a common situation which usually happens
in a real wireless communication, since it may be too ”ex-
pensive” for every radio receiver/transmitter to keep the
information from the channels of all other devices.
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Harsanyi and Selten [18] at first proposed an extension
of the Nash solution to Bayesian bargaining problems.
A new generalization of the Nash bargaining solution for
two player games with incomplete information was pre-
sented by Myerson [19].
The main contributions of this paper are twofold. Firstly,
the coalition formation among SBSs with incomplete infor-
mation in the CR networks is studied. A Bayesian equi-
librium which allows to formulate the study of the coali-
tion formation among SBSs with incomplete information
in CR network is given. Secondly, an algorithm for build-
ing a coalition of SBSs is formulated. Each SBS decides
to enter or leave the coalition for the sake of maximizing
its utility function. Finally, the system model is validated
through simulation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 the system model is presented in details. Section 3
is devoted to the coalition formation among the SBSs with
incomplete information. In Section 4, an algorithm for the
coalition formation of SBSs with incomplete information
is described. Section 5 presents some simulation results.
The paper and its possible extensions are summarized in
the concluding remarks of Section 6.
2. The System Model
In this section, the model of the CR system consisting of
the PUs and the SUs is presented. Assuming that to the
CR network also belong N secondary base stations (SBSs).
Each i-th SBS can service number Li of SUs in a specific
geographical area. It means that each SBS provides cov-
erage area for a given cell or mesh. Let N be the set of
all SBSs and K be the set of all PUs. Each PU can use
a number of admissible wireless channels. We assume that
each SU can employ the k-th channel of PU, if the k-th
channel is not transmitting and this channel is available for
the SU. According to the approach given by D. Niyato [21]
each i-th SBS can be characterized by accurate statistics
regarding a subset Ki ∈ K of PUs during the period of
time the channels remain stationary.
Let each i-th SBS use energy detectors which belong to the
main practical signal detectors in the CR network. Assum-
ing the Raleigh fading, the probability that the i-th SBS
accurately received the signal from PU k ∈ K is given
by [5]
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2
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where λi,k is the energy detection threshold selected by
the i-th SBS for sensing the k-th channel, m is the time
bandwidth product. γk,i is the average SNR of the received
signal from the k-th PU and is given by γk, j =
Pkgk,i
σ 2
, where
Pk is the transmit power of the k-th PU, gki = 1dµk,i
is the
path loss between the k-th PU and the i-th SBS, dki is the
distance between the k-th PU and the i-th SBS, σ2 is the
Gaussian noise variance.
Thus, as was shown in [5] the false alarm probability per-
ceived by the i-th SBS i∈N over the k-th channel, k ∈K ,
belonging to PU, is given by
Pif al,k = Pf al =
Γ(m, λi,k2 )
Γ(m)
, (2)
where Γ(., .) is the incomplete gamma function and Γ(.) is
the gamma function.
The non-cooperative false alarm probability depends on the
position of SU. Thus, the index k in Eq. (2) could be
dropped, and the missing probability perceived by the i-th
SBS, is [5], [6]
Pmis,i = 1−Pdet,i . (3)
Assuming a non-cooperative collaboration for every i-th
SBS, i∈N the amount of information which is transmitted
to the SUs served by it over its control channel can be obtain
from
v({i}) = ∑
k∈Ki
Li∑
j=1
[(1−Pif al,k)θkρ ji−αk(1−Pidet,k)
(1−θk)(ρkrk −ρ
j
krk)] , (4)
where Li is the number of SUs served by the i-th SBS, αu
is the penalty factor imposed by the k-th PU for the SU that
causes the interference. (1−Pidet,k) defines the probability
that the i-th SBS treated channel k as available while the
PU is actually transmitting. The probability (ρkrk −ρ
j
krk)
indicates the reduction of a successful transmission at its
receiver rk of the k-th PU at its receiver rk caused by the
transmission from the j-th SU over k-th channel. It means
the probability that the SNR received by the i-th SBS is
given by [22]
ρ ji = e
−
v0
γ j,i , (5)
where v0 is the target SNR for all PUs, SUs, SBSs, γ j,i
is the average SNR received by the i-th SBS from all SUs
with the transmit power Pj of the j-th SU. It is defined as
γ ji =
Pigkrk
σ2 + g jiPj
, (6)
where Pi gives PU i’s probability of successful transmission
at its receiver ri, g ji is the channel gain between the j-th
SU and the i-th SBS.
Assuming Rayleigh fading and BPSK modulation within
each coalition, the probability of reporting error between
the i-th SBS and the j-th SU [7] is given by
Pe,i, j =
1
2
(
1−
√
γ j,i
2 + γ j,i
)
. (7)
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Inside a coalition C by a collaborative sensing, the missing
and the false alarm probabilities of a coalition is given by:
Qmis,C = ∏
i∈C
[Pmis,i(1−Pe,i, j)+ (1−Pmis, j)Pe,i, j] , (8)
Q f al,C = 1−∏
i∈C
[(1−Pf al)(1−Pe,i, j)+ Pf alPe,i, j] . (9)
3. The Coalition Formation Among
Secondary Base Stations
with Incomplete Information
in the CR Networks
In this section the SBS game with incomplete information
in CR network is presented.
The problem can be formulated with the help of using
a cooperative game theory [16]. More formally, we have
a (Ω,u) coalition game, where Ω is the set of players
(the SBSs) and u is the utility function or the value of
the coalition.
Following the coalition game of Harsanyi [18], a possible
definition for a Bayesian game [17] is as follows.
Definition 1 (Bayesian game)
A Bayesian game G is a strategic-form game with incom-
plete information, which can be described as follows
G = 〈Ω,{Tk,Ak,ρk,uk}k∈K 〉 (10)
which consists of:
– a player set: Ω = {1, . . . ,N},
– a type set: Tn(T = T1×T2×·· ·×TN),
– an action set: An(A = A1×A2×·· ·AN),
– a probability function set: ρn : Tn →F (T−n),
– a payoff function set: un : A ×T → R, where
un(a,τ) is the the payoff of player n when action
profile is a ∈A and type profile is τ ∈ T .
The set of strategies depends on the type of the player.
Additionally, it is assumed that the type of the player is
relevant to his decision. The decision is dependent on in-
formation which it possesses. A strategy for the player is
a function mapping its type set into it action set. The prob-
ability function ρk represents the conditional probability
ρk(−τk|τk) that is assigned to the type of profile τuk ∈T−k
by the given τk.
The payoff function of player k is a function of strat-
egy profile s(.) = {s1(.), . . . ,sK(.)} and the type profile
τ = {τ1, . . . ,τK} of all players in the game and is given
by
uk(s(τ),τ) = uk(s1(τ1), . . . ,sN(τN),τ1, . . . ,τN) . (11)
In a strategic-form game with complete information, each
player chooses one action. In a Bayesian game each player
chooses a set or collection of actions, strategy sk(.).
A definition for a payoff of player in the Bayesian game as
follows:
Definition 2 (The player’s payoff)
The player’s payoff in a Bayesian game is given by
uk(s˜k(τk),s−k(τ−k),τ) = uk(s1(τ1), . . . , s˜k(τk),
sk+1(τk+1), . . . ,sN(τN),τ) , (12)
where s˜k(.),s−k(.) denotes the strategy profile where all
players play s(.) except player k.
Next, we define the Bayesian equilibrium (BE) as follows:
Definition 3 (Bayesian equilibrium)
The strategy profile s∗(.) is a Bayesian equilibrium (BE),
if for all k ∈N , and for all sk(.) ∈ Sk and s−k(.) ∈ S−k
Eτ [uk(s∗k(τ−k),τ)]≥ Eτ
[
uk(sk(τk),s
∗
−k(τ−k),τ)
]
, (13)
where
Eτ [uk(xk(τk),x−k(τ−k),τ)]
△
= ∑
τ−k∈T−k
ρk(τ−k | τk) ,
uk(xk(τk),x−k(τ−k),τ) , (14)
is the expected payoff of player k, which is averaged over
the joint distribution of all players’ types.
For the proposed game the false alarm probabilities for the
i-th and j SBSs over channel k are given by Pif al,k and P jf al,k.
Thus, the utility function or the value of the coalition is
given by u(C), namely
u(C) = (1−Qmis,C)−Cost(Q f al,C) , (15)
where Qmis,C is the missing probability of coalition C.
For the cooperation problem the following definition can
be provided [16].
Definition 4 (Transferable utility of coalitional game)
A coalitional game (Ω,u) is said to have a transferable
utility if value u(C) can be arbitrarily apportioned between
the coalition players. Otherwise, the coalitional game has
a non-transferable utility and each player will have their
own utility within coalition C.
Based on these concerns, it is important to say, that the
utility of coalition C is equal to the utility of each SBS in
the coalition. Thus, the used (Ω,u) coalitional game model
has a non-transferable utility. In the coalitional game the
stability of the grand coalition of all the players is generally
assumed and the grand coalition maximizes the utilities of
the players. Then, player i may to choose the randomized
strategy s which maximizes his expected utility. Informally,
we could provide a Nash equilibrium here.
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Assuming the perfect coalition of SBS Cper, the false alarm
probability is given by
Q f al,Cper = 1− ∏
i∈Cper
(1−Pf al) = 1− (1−Pf al)|Cper | . (16)
4. The Coalition Formation Algorithm
In this section, an algorithm for the coalition formation
of SBS with incomplete information in CR networks is
proposed. The algorithm works on two levels: the possi-
ble coalition formation and the grand coalition formation.
The first level is the basis for all the coalitions formation.
Each member of group C cooperates so as to maximize
their collective payoff. At this level a maximum number
of SBSs per coalition is defined. At the second level the
grand coalition is formed. Firstly, the utility function of
the formed coalition is calculated. If the utility function of
formed coalition reaches the maximum value, the Bayesian
equilibrium (BE) is tested for the coaltion. Finding the
Bayesian equilibrium (BE) finishes the operation of the al-
gorithm. If two or more coalitions possess the Bayesian
equilibrium with the same value of the payoff, the normal-
ized equilibrium introduced by Rosen [20] is proposed here
exists, where it is shown that a unique equilibrium exists
if the payoff functions satisfy the condition of the diagonal
strictly concave.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code of the proposed algo-
rithm.
Algorithm 1: BSSs coalition formation
Input: False alarm probability for each coalition
1 |Cper f |:= 1;
2 compute Q f al,C;
3 while Q f al,C > Q f al,Cper f do
4 for i = 1 to N do
5 compute Q f al,C;
6 if BE exists for given |Cper f | then
7 |Cper f |:= i; go to 10;
8 else
9 |Cper f |:= i+ 1
10 end
11 end
12 label 10;
13 end
5. Simulation Results
A simulation was used to confirm the above given algorithm
for the coalition formation among the SBSs with incomplete
information. The simulation of the CR network has a four
square with the PU at the center. Each square is equal to
1× 1 km. In each square 4 SBSs and 8 SUs were ran-
domly deployed. Initially, it was assumed that each SBS is
non-cooperative and detects information from its neighbors
by means of the common channels. The energy detection
threshold λi,k for an i-th SBS over channel k was chosen
following the false probability Pif ,k = 0.05, ∀i ∈N , k ∈ K.
The transmit power of all the SU was assumed as equal to
to 10 mW, the transmit power of all the PUs was equal to
100 mW, the noise variance σ2 =−90 dBm.
Fig. 1. The average payoff per SBS versus the number of SBSs.
Figure 1 presents the average payoff per SBS versus the
number of SBSs for both the organization of the CR net-
work with a coalition of SBSs and the non-cooperation
of SBSs. Both results are averaged over random positions
of all the nodes (SUs and PUs). In the case of non-
cooperation game of SBS the average payoff per SBS has
a smaller value than for the cooperation game of SBS.
The proposed algorithm significantly increases the average
payoff up to 140% relative to the non-cooperative case at
the number of 15 SBSs. Figure 2 shows the number of
Fig. 2. The number of SBSs versus the average maximum coali-
tion number of SBSs.
SBSs versus the average maximum coalition number. The
graph shows that the number of SBSs increases with the
maximum average coalition number. It is due to the fact
that as N increases, the number of potential members of
the coalition increases. The graph indicates that the typi-
cal size of the SBS coalition is proportional to the num-
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ber of SBSs for the certain value. A large number of SBSs
does not allow for the formulation of a relatively large
coalition.
Fig. 3. Jain’s fairness index (JFI) for available bandwidth units
for cooperative and non-cooperative games.
Figure 3 shows that the coalition among SBSs allows us to
obtain a higher value of Jain’s fairness index for available
bandwidth units. Jain’s fairness index is defined as [23]
JFI =
(∑Nbi xi)2
Nb ∑Nbi=1 x2i
, (17)
where xi denotes a bandwidth unit and Nb is the number of
all bandwidth units. The results show that all cooperation
games take the maximum values of the JFI index.
Fig. 4. Maximum achieved throughput for various value of the
utility contribution weighting factor w.
Figure 4 shows the results of the average transmissions
of SBSs coalition in terms of achieved throughput per SB
(the player’s achieved throughput in the coalition divided
by the total available bandwidth) for various values of the
utility-component weighting factor w (w ∈ [0.3,0.6,0.9]),
and for assumed SNR value. Here, it can be seen that the
transmitted power exceeds the power limit for small SNR
value and for w = 0.3. Thus, a higher throughput is achieved
due to the lack of noise. If w = 0.9, the opposite results
are obtained because the SB is forced to be more power
efficient. By assuming w = 0.6 in the game, the optimal
curve of the achieved throughput and the bandwidth can
be obtained.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, a new scheme for the coalition game among
the SBSs in CR networks was proposed. The main ad-
vantage of the presented solution lies in the coalition for-
mation of the SBS with incomplete information and the
conveyed knowledge of the spectrum for all the SUs in
the system. The proposed algorithm allows to ensure co-
operation among the SBSs. The payoff of every coalition
of the SBSs allows to decide to join or leave the coali-
tion. Finally, using showed algorithm, the SBSs can reach
a Bayesian equilibrium. The results of the simulation also
confirm that proposed algorithm improved the average pay-
off of the SBSs coalition with incomplete information up
to 140% in comparison to the non-cooperative case.
The future work should consider the confrontation of the
proposed algorithm with that of an centralized solution.
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